Optimal diversity: increasing returns versus recombinant innovation by Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M. van den
www.ssoar.info
Optimal diversity: increasing returns versus
recombinant innovation
Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M. van den
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Bergh, J. C. v. d. (2008). Optimal diversity: increasing returns versus recombinant innovation. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, 68(3-4), 565-580. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.09.003
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-277463
Accepted Manuscript
Title: Optimal Diversity: Increasing Returns versus
Recombinant Innovation
Author: Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh
PII: S0167-2681(08)00183-2
DOI: doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.09.003
Reference: JEBO 2257
To appear in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Received date: 6-7-2007
Revised date: 14-9-2008
Accepted date: 14-9-2008
Please cite this article as: van den Bergh, J.C.J.M., Optimal Diversity: Increasing Returns
versus Recombinant Innovation, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
(2008), doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.09.003
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication.
As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript.
The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof
before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process
errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that
apply to the journal pertain.
Page 1 of 35
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
2nd revision, December 2007
Optimal Diversity:
Increasing Returns versus Recombinant Innovation
Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh
ICREA, Barcelona, Spain
&
Institute for Environmental Science and Technology 
& Department of Economics and Economic History
Autonomous University of Barcelona
Spain
&
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 
& Institute for Environmental Studies
Free University, Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Address: 
Institute of Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA)
Autonomous University of Barcelona
Edifici Cn - Campus UAB
08193 Bellaterra (Cerdanyola)
Spain
Email :  jeroen.bergh@uab.es  and  jbergh@feweb.vu.nl
Phone :  0034-93581.3747 (secr. 3324 or 3748)
Fax :  0034-93581.3331
* Title Page (with Full Author Details)
Page 2 of 35
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Optimal Diversity: 
Increasing Returns versus Recombinant Innovation 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Choices regarding diversity play an important role in economics and innovation management, 
but often remain implicit. Once made explicit, the objectives of efficiency and diversity are 
usually posed as in conflict, as efficiency relates positively and diversity negatively to various 
increasing returns to scale in markets. Such a perspective, however, neglects the benefits of 
diversity in terms of realizing system improvements through recombinant innovation or 
spillovers. The latter implies a contribution of diversity to long-term efficiency. Dominant 
economic approaches that address diversity, such as option value and real options theories, 
regard benefits of diversity as exogenous. This paper proposes a simple model of variable, 
endogenous diversity to analyze the optimal balance between increasing returns to scale and 
recombinant innovation. It is discussed under which conditions one of four solutions is 
optimal: complete specialization regardless of which option, complete specialization in one 
specific option, symmetric diversity (perfect balance), and asymmetric diversity. The results 
give rise to a number of policy insights. 
 
Key words: balance, disparity, distribution, economies of scale, efficiency, evolution, 
exploration vs. exploitation, investment theory, learning, R&D. 
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1. Introduction 
Choices regarding diversity play an important role in economics and innovation management, 
but they usually remain implicit or are simply neglected. If diversity is made explicit, it is 
often posed as conflicting with the goal of efficiency, based on the belief that efficiency 
relates positively and diversity negatively to various increasing returns to scale that are 
present at demand and supply sides of markets. For instance, in deciding about the investment 
of scarce funds, individuals, firms or public agencies are often in doubt whether to reap the 
benefits of scale economies by focusing investments on a single option, or whether to keep 
different options open at the cost of losing returns to scale. Investing in a diversity of options 
is then often quickly judged as wasting scarce means, on the basis of the argument that one 
was incapable of making a best choice. The objectives of efficiency (or cost-effectiveness) 
and diversity are then considered in conflict. It will be argued here that such a 
conceptualization is incomplete and can in fact give rise to non-optimal choices. 
 The above-sketched supposed opposition between efficiency and diversity represents 
a rather static perspective on scale-diversity trade-offs and neglects the benefits of diversity in 
terms of not just keeping options open but especially realizing system improvements. Such 
improvements may result from what can be called ‘recombinant innovation’ and ‘spillovers 
between different options’. As these phenomena are positively related to diversity, they imply 
a contribution of the latter to future benefits and thus long-term efficiency. In evolutionary 
language this might be summarized as ‘evolutionary progress’. In effect, this perspective 
means that an optimal investment decision really comes down to identifying the optimal level 
of diversity rather than choosing a particular option. Thus the fundamental question here is 
about the optimal degree of diversity, in terms of the number of alternatives invested in as 
well as the balance of investments in the various alternatives, ranging from uniform to very 
uneven.  
 To answer this question, a simple model of endogenous diversity, probabilistic 
recombinant innovation, and returns to scale is developed that can address the issue of 
dynamic welfare or cost-benefit analysis in a framework of changing diversity. This model 
will incorporate the following aspects of diversity. Diversity has a cost due to lost 
opportunities for enjoying increasing returns to scale. In addition, diversity is associated with 
benefits of innovation and progress as options are not static but dynamic and emergent 
through probabilistic recombination (or modular evolution) and spill-overs. A trade-off 
between these costs and benefits allows the assessment of optimal diversity. In line with 
Stirling (2007), three components of diversity will be assumed to have an impact on the 
probability of successful recombinant innovation, namely variety, balance and disparity. 
These notions are explained in Section 2. 
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 2 
 The approach adopted here is motivated by several related, unresolved problems. The 
mentioned trade-off between enjoying economies of scale and enjoying ‘economies of 
diversity’ really is a central issue in innovation theory and evolutionary economics, but it is 
somehow not recognized as such, which may explain why general theoretical insights and 
decision rules are lacking. On the other hand, in practice decisions on investment and 
innovation are regularly motivated by short-term efficiency, as is reflected by a common 
focus on cost-effectiveness and a widespread interest in short pay-back times of investments. 
Of course, such myopia is partly due to short-term interests being often better represented in 
reality than long term interests, with regard to both public and private investments. Another 
reason for myopia is that scale advantages are generally more clear and certain than diversity 
advantages, as the latter involve uncertain (probabilistic) recombinant innovations and spill-
overs. The short-term bias in the practice of investment decision making is possibly 
reinforced by the fact that existing investment theories, models and evaluation techniques are 
lacking attention to long-term efficiency that takes account of the dynamic character, impact 
and resulting value of diversity. This does not deny that diversity is recognized as important 
in innovation studies, but here it is mainly addressed through the descriptive notion of niche 
markets (e.g., Frenken et al. 1999, Tisdell and Seidl 2004, Schot and Geels 2007). A clear 
perspective on the precise trade-offs at stake when deciding about diversity is missing. 
A particular motivation for the present study is the current, worldwide plea to make a 
rapid transition from the current fossil fuel dominated economy to production and 
consumption modes depending more on renewable energy, notably biofuels, wind and solar 
energy. The latter evidently require many investments in uncertain technological paths. Not 
surprisingly, this scares away many firms, politicians and voters, and instead many of these 
argue in favor of reaping short-term benefits by investing predominantly in energy 
conservation, capture and storage of CO2, and combined-heat-and-power. The latter options, 
however, run the risk of leading to a reinforcement of the fossil fuel economy, thus making an 
escape or ‘un-locking’ of it increasingly difficult (Geels 2002, van den Bergh et al. 2006). It 
seems that investors and politicians are hesitant to exchange fairly certain short-term cost-
savings for diversity with uncertain (but nevertheless likely) long-term economic and 
environmental benefits. As a result, it is pretty sure that choices currently made in this area 
are not optimal from a long-term social welfare angle (van den Bergh et al. 2006, van den 
Bergh 2007). 
The problem of scale versus diversity addressed here is somewhat related to two other 
problems. The first is the so-called ‘exploration versus exploitation dilemma’ (March 1991). 
This is about the balance between research for new technologies and the development of 
existing knowledge. The second problem is known as ‘narrow windows, blind giants and 
angry orphans’. This is about managers or policy makers who make strategic choices and face 
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the dilemma that it becomes ever more difficult to alter a current development path as the 
information on what is the optimal strategy increases (David 1986 and 1987). The analysis of 
these problems, however, does not specifically address recombinant innovation or spill-over 
and therefore differs fundamentally from the approach adopted here. 
In addition, it is useful to position the proposed new approach in the field of 
investment theories. Dominant theories here are option value (Arrow and Fisher 1974, Henry 
1974) and real options theories (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). These are different from the current 
approach in that they do not capture the intricate advantages and endogenous dynamics of 
diversity, but instead pose the value of diversity as exogenous. In addition, these theories are 
mostly concerned with investment in exclusive rather than simultaneous alternatives, in which 
case recombination is not feasible. Another important approach is classical portfolio theory, 
which also takes diversity and its value as fixed and given (Markowitz 1952, Sharpe 1964). In 
Section 3 these and a number of related formal approaches will be briefly reviewed and 
evaluated against the studied problem. 
 Finally, the focus on diversity and recombinant innovation brings us into the realm of 
evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter 1982, Dosi et al. 1988, Andersen 1994, Potts 
2000). Diversity is the key concept within evolutionary thinking, evolutionary computation, 
and evolutionary economics alike. It means a step away from traditional economics with its 
core assumption of representative agents. Giving attention to diversity requires adopting 
instead a population approach to describe agents and their strategies. The smallest population 
consists of only two elements, which will be the starting point for the formal analysis offered 
here. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant 
aspects of diversity, employing insights from economics, biology, evolutionary computation 
and organization studies. Section 3 reviews the assumptions and insights of a number of 
model-based approaches that have been proposed to study investment decisions and the role 
of diversity in economic systems. Section 4 introduces the model of optimal, endogenous 
diversity with increasing returns to scale and recombinant innovation. Section 5 presents the 
results of numerical analyses performed with this model. Section 6 discusses policy insights. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Diversity 
In line with evolutionary biology as well as recent discussions on biodiversity loss and 
conservation, Stirling (1998, 2007) notes that diversity is a multidimensional concept. He 
proposes to characterize it by three dimensions or elements, namely variety, balance and 
disparity. Variety denotes the number of different technologies, processes, products, 
organizations, institutions or strategies in a population of elements. Variety can comprise 
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identities (appearance), functions, or behaviors (knowledge, problem-solving capacity). 
Balance or equality relates to the extent to which one or more elements dominate in a 
population in terms of size or number (frequency). Disparity or dissimilarity refers to the 
degree of difference between elements in a population. Many indicators of diversity are 
available (Maignan et al. 2003, Stirling 2007). Stirling (2007) offers a very general formal 
framework and uses this to identify (implicit) assumptions underlying a number of well-
known diversity and inequality measures (e.g., Gini, Shannon, Simpson indicators). The three 
dimensions of diversity  (variety, balance and disparity)  may each affect innovation and 
selection and thus future diversity as well as benefits. 
 Diversity is the material upon which evolution works, and it affects both core 
processes of evolution, namely selection and innovation. Selection can realize a better 
outcome if it works upon more diversity. This is reflected in the famous theorem by Fisher 
(1930) which says that the greater the genetic variability upon which selection for fitness acts, 
the greater the expected improvement in fitness is. Indeed, selection (survival and 
reproduction) that builds upon a broader basis (greater diversity) can realize a higher 
performance and thus a higher average fitness of survivors (selected units) (e.g., Metcalfe 
1994 and 1998). In addition, greater diversity means a greater potential for creative 
combinations. This has in the literature been addressed in various way, leading to notions like 
recombination or cross-over (in genetics and evolutionary computation), modular evolution 
(in biology, evolutionary computation, and technological innovation studies), and spill-over 
(in economics of technological change).  
Modular evolution can be seen as a generalization of the older recombinant (or 
crossover) and symbiosis concepts, and it denotes that complementary units combine to a 
previously nonexistent unit with new, emergent features (Schlosser and Wagner 2004, 
Watson 2006). Modular evolution is the source of radical innovations in both natural and 
social-technological history (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995, Mokyr 1990, Henderson 
and Clark 1990). Te hnological examples are of all times: pc and battery combining into a 
laptop, and watermill technology and sail concept leading to a windmill. Spill-over is less 
ambitious and means that one idea, behavior or technology inspires a change in another, 
which then improves in terms of functioning (fitness, productivity). Potts has proposed a kind 
of extension of the notion of modularity, namely ‘hyperstructure’. This denotes that products, 
techniques, organizations and institutions can be regarded as nested networks of connections. 
Innovations involve new connections, while major innovations would mean a new nesting or 
an (emergent) higher level (i.e. a more complex hyperstructure).  
Innovation through recombination is a common approach in evolutionary 
computation, and has proven to be effective (Eiben and Smith 2003). Note that here 
recombination, like in biology, usually involves two inputs (‘parents’), analogous to the 
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crossover of chromosomes during meiosis in diploid, sexual organisms. In social, economic 
and cultural applications, however, the restriction to two inputs is unnecessary, as 
recombination is not restricted by a sexual type of process (two parents). Instead, one can 
expect regular combinations of more than two inputs, implying a wider spectrum of 
innovations and a greater opportunity for radical innovation. Think of recent mobile phones 
that combine sms, email, internet, music and camera (even photo and video). 
 Supporting or increasing diversity and especially maintaining the element of balance 
in diversity has an additional benefit, namely avoiding rapid or easy lock-in. Search for short-
term efficiency or even net present value optimization often results in increasing returns to 
scale through network and informational externalities and imitation at the demand side or 
economies of scale in production, learning-by-doing, and technological standardization at the 
supply side. In terms of diversity this means that one or only a few alternatives survive. This 
is known in the literature as path-dependence and the extreme case of a single surviving, 
dominant alternative as lock-in.1 Not necessarily the best alternative gets locked-in. This is 
due to a combination of coincidence (‘historical accident’) at an early stage of market 
development and positive feedback or self-reinforcement due to the presence of the various 
increasing returns on demand and supply sides (Arthur 1989, Foray 1997). In the present 
framework, one could interpret such lock-in as representing a minimum of potential diversity. 
An inevitable final question is whether one should strive ultimately for a dominant 
alternative (technology)? Perhaps not, as one might want to guarantee a minimum level of 
diversity of alternatives as a sort of insurance or resilience in the face of unforeseeable 
economic, political or environmental changes and future problems. Carroll and Hannon 
(2000) point at an old evolutionary principle, namely that in an uncertain world an internally 
diverse system (population) is more likely to respond appropriately to external changes than a 
homogeneous system. Similar ideas are found in the literature on resilience, adaptive 
management and policy experiments (Walters 1986, Gunderson and Holling 2002, Rammel 
and van den Bergh 2003). Resilience was originally proposed as an extended ecological 
stability concept that stresses ecosystem flexibility in the face of both external shocks and 
gradual, slow change (Holling 1973). Two types of resilience are commonly recognized, 
namely the time necessary for a disturbed system to return to its original state (Pimm 1984) 
and the disturbance that a system can absorb before moving to another state (Holling 1986). 
Resilience has further been proposed as a specific interpretation of (environmental) 
sustainability (Common and Perrings 1992) and has also been used to address the internal 
functioning of social-economic systems (Levin et al. 1998). Resilience is mostly associated 
with an insurance and precautionary perspective on the role of diversity, but is not necessarily 
                                                          
1
 If an external environment is heterogeneous (i.e. adaptation is to a local environment that is isolated to some 
degree), different technologies might adapt to each of the resulting niches. 
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inconsistent with regarding diversity as a source of recombination. Stirling (2004) offers a 
more elaborate discussion on the potential link between diversity and resilience.  
 
3. Inspiration from existing economic and evolutionary models 
Before developing a set of evolutionary models incorporating the value of diversity, it is 
useful to examine what formal models and related insights the literature already offers. 
Several approaches are available to address investment decisions in the face of alternative 
options, namely option value theory, real options (investment under uncertainty) theory, 
porfolio investment theory, and a few other less influential approaches. 
 Option value theory has stressed the existence of options in the face of uncertainty 
about benefits and irreversible or even irrevocable change (e.g., deforestation, soil pollution, 
ecosystem destruction, biodiversity loss, or extreme climate change). A founding paper is 
Weisbrod (1964). Krutilla (1967) argued that decisions made in private markets do not lead to 
socially desirable use, allocation and conservation of nature and natural lands. He draws 
attention to the complex relationship between nature conservation, irreversibility and relative 
values. These values cover uses such as outdoor recreation, education and science alike. 
Influential innovations of this paper are the notions of option demand and value. Important 
follow-up studies formalizing this problem are Fisher et al. (1972), Arrow and Fisher (1974), 
Henry (1974) and Epstein (1980). This literature suggests that under certain conditions 
irreversible developments should be avoided or postponed when better information can be 
obtained. The models used generally consider two exclusive alternatives, namely 
development and preservation, and restrict the problem to a two-period setting. The notion of 
quasi-option value is derived from this approach. It reflects the value of extra information 
obtained by waiting (i.e. not developing or investing but preserving the current state) in the 
face of irreversibility and uncertainty. The Krutilla-Fisher algorithm is one approach to 
change standard cost-benefit analysis to include irreversibility of development, namely by 
treating foregone benefits of preservation as opportunity costs of development (for a good 
account, see Porter, 1982).  
 Closely related are theories of investment under uncertainty (Pindyck 1991, Dixit and 
Pindyck 1994) and real options theory (Luehrman 1998). These theories have links with 
options pricing theory in financial economics (Black and Scholes 1973), where an option is 
defined as the right to make a financial investment decision in a certain time interval. A real 
option then is the right to make a concrete business decision, often an investment in a project 
or property, that involves physical, tangible assets such as equipment. Real options theory 
takes account of the monetary value of (managerial) flexibility to adapt earlier decisions in 
the face of uncertain external developments. A number of real options can be distinguished, 
namely postponement of investment (until market conditions are better), expanding (growth) 
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or downsizing, flexibility (abandoning other projects in the future), an exit option (cancelling 
a project), learning (research and development), and mergers and acquisitions. Taking into 
account real options can significantly change the valuation of investments as derived from a 
traditional net present value approach. Pindyck (2000) examines the notion of optimal timing 
of environmental policy using real options theory. Coggins and Ramezani (1998) and Fisher 
(2000) shows that option value theory is equivalent with the theory of investment under 
uncertainty, which is disputed by Aslaksen and Synnestvedt (2004). 
 Portfolio investment theory developed by Markowitz (1952) and elaborated in the 
capital asset pricing model by Sharpe (1964) is the more classical approach to study diversity. 
It focuses on mean-variance trade-offs on an efficiency frontier involving multiple securities. 
The main insight was that investors should be focused on selecting well-balanced portfolios 
instead of individual securities. This portfolio theory is not dynamic, although temporal 
effects may be included in the valuation of securities. 
 Of the other approaches to deal with alternative options and irreversibility, the 
following deserve attention. Hong and Page (2004) develop a model to examine the role of 
diversity in the context of groups of intelligent, problem solving agents. They find that a 
group of randomly selected agents outperforms a group consisting of the best-performing 
agents. Greater individual ability of the latter is more than offset by the lack of problem-
solving diversity at the group level. Garcia et al. (2003) develop a systems dynamics model of 
the decomposition of R&D efforts into explorative and exploitative activities and identify 
four relevant factors: resource availability, exogenous competition, aging of knowledge bases, 
and adaptive capacity to the environment. Gollier et al. (2000) formalize the rationality of 
adhering to a precautionary principle (i.e. keeping options open). Young (2001) replaces 
expected utility maximization by Shackle’s (1949) approach, which pays attention to potential 
surprise and uncertainty-induced demand failures. Krysiak and Krysiak (2006) present an 
analysis of uncertainty and irreversibility by demanding that an allocation is envy-free, 
leading to an interpretation of sustainability as an intertemporal distribution in which no 
future generation prefers to live at an earlier point in history. In addition, sustainability at the 
level p can be defined as equivalent with future generations with a small probability p being 
willing to live earlier in time. In this way the authors can avoid the fundamental problem of 
interpersonal or intergenerational welfare comparisons. In addition, with regard to climate 
change particularly, irreversibility of investment has received attention as well (e.g., Birge 
and Rosa 1996, Kolstad 1994, Ulph and Ulph 1997). 
 A theoretical framework based on genetic distance to study optimal diversity was 
proposed by Weitzman (1992) and perfected by Weitzman (1998a), with application to 
biodiversity in mind. He studies the problem of protecting biodiversity under a limited budget 
constraint. A criterion for setting priorities among biodiversity-protecting projects is based on 
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the assumption that the loss of biodiversity due to the extinction of a species is exactly 
equivalent to the distinctiveness of that species. The latter is defined as the genetic distance 
between species. Baumgärtner (2004) and Van der Heide et al. (2005) have extended this 
approach with ecological relationships, which may lead to other policy advice. For a dynamic 
approach that combines biodiversity with resource and ecological dynamics, see Swanson 
(1994). 
Finally, a formalization of polarization, a specific form of diversity, is proposed by 
Esteban and Ray (1994). They argue that polarization is important for the study of social 
conflict and that it is fundamentally different from inequality. For example, a polarized 
system may be consistent with low inequality as measured with traditional indicators, such as 
a Lorenz curve (or Gini coefficient). 
 All of the studies mentioned above can be seen as treating diversity in an exogenous 
way, meaning that diversity does not affect system dynamics and its valuation, while diversity 
itself does not change over time, except in the sense that an option may be foreclosed or 
maintained. The application to environment and resources usually also involves a problem in 
which there is asymmetry of options: development or exploitation of a resource excludes its 
conservation, whereas conservation implies the future option of development. The issue of 
interest in this paper is subtly different: alternative options exist alongside and can influence 
each other (spillover), or possibly be combined to generate new options (i.e. more diversity).  
 The previous studies do not include interaction between options (spill-over, 
recombination). Recombinant growth as studied by Weitzman (1998b), Olson and Frey 
(2002) and Tsur and Zemel (2006) captures recombinant innovation. Weitzman presented a 
formal model in which the number of new combinations is a combinatorial function of the 
number of existing ideas (he speaks of “hybridization of ideas”). He shows that if this number 
were the only limiting factor in knowledge production, super-exponential growth would 
result, which evidently does not conform to reality (but perhaps we are not managing 
diversity well enough). Combining ideas and technologies, however, requires R&D efforts 
and outlays that use scarce financial, labor and capital resources. Weitzman assumes a 
constant (exogenous) share of output to be allocated to R&D, which results in balanced long-
run growth. In other words, the limit to growth is not due to a limited number of 
recombinations or new ideas but due to limited R&D resources. While Weitzman provides a 
foundation of growth in recombinant innovation, he does not derive rules for optimal 
recombinant growth. In addition, Weitzman’s approach does not really provide a micro 
foundation, as individual alternatives that may recombine are not explicitly described. 
Instead, a function to represent the number of different binary pairings and a “binary 
recombinant expansion process” are defined. This involves some level of aggregation in the 
description, or a black box. Tsur and Zemel extend Weitzman’s model with an endogenous 
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growth component by making R&D decisions endogenous and find that Weitzman’s constant 
R&D output or income share is consistent with optimal long run growth. Olson and Frey  
connect Weitzman’s recombinant growth with Schumpeter’s view of the entrepreneur as 
innovating by combining existing ideas or technologies in a convex way. They demonstrate 
that the resulting combinatory process is constrained by five factors: convexity implies 
exhaustion of technological opportunities, the cost of combining increases with distance 
(disparity) between originating ideas, combining ideas that are technologically close is 
rational (i.e. best for profits), social acceptance constrains or prohibits certain combinations of 
ideas, and a ruling technological paradigm limits the scope for continuing combining; they 
suggest that, in fact, a very restrictive technological opportunity set may stimulate a paradigm 
change. 
 Within evolutionary economics several models are worth mentioning here. The NK 
complexity model (Kauffman 1993, Frenken 2000) stresses the combinatorial nature of 
design space. Here N denotes the number of elements (each with diversity of values/alleles), 
while K is the number of connections between elements (complexity measure). A fitness or 
performance function can be defined over the design space. This has been applied, among 
others, to the steam engine to analyze which possible designs have emerged in reality and 
which ones (including hypothetical ones) (could) have performed well (Frenken and Nuvolari 
2004). Based on the idea that transitions are best perceived as involving multiple transition 
steps, Frenken has recently used this model to examine how one can best move in complexity 
space from one design to others, taking into account irreversibility and flexibility (not 
foreclosing options, including new evidence, and changing preferences), uncertainty and the 
theoretically best performing alternative (the end goal). This leads to a trade-off between 
flexibility, best (efficient) end point, and shortest route (cost of intermediate steps). He 
illustrates the approach with an application to possible future car systems (Frenken 2007). 
 Munro (1997) extends the standard, general model of optimal use of a renewable 
resource with pesticide use that exerts a negative intertemporal externality due to genetic 
selection. He illustrates this for an insecticide that raises the fitness of resistant insects relative 
to their susceptible competitors. The perspective can be that of an individual farmer or, more 
realistically, a policy maker trying to understand the optimal dosage of insecticide in a region. 
Some main insights obtained are as follows. The traditional planning solution can be 
considered to be myopic as it does not anticipate evolution. Instead, optimization under 
perfect foresight about evolutionary consequences of insecticide use gives the fully optimal 
plan. Comparison of myopic and fully optimal plans shows that under the latter the size of the 
pest population is lower, while the proportion of susceptible individuals is higher. For a 
higher discount rate the optimal pesticide use will be higher as well so that resistance will 
increase. As a corollary, under myopia, investment in R&D on new pesticides will be 
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relatively high. This model only addresses selection (irreversible loss of genetic diversity), 
excluding innovation. 
 Iwai (1984) presents a general evolutionary-economics model that combines 
innovation and selection through imitation. In a way, this is the archetype evolutionary-
economic model, as it provides a rather complete description of increase (innovation) and 
decrease (selection) of diversity. Iwai refers to these as disequilibrating and equilibrating 
forces, respectively, that give rise to collapsing (narrowing), exploding (broadening) and 
shifting probability distributions of a certain technological feature. Analysis with the model 
shows that the technological distribution in an industry will never reach equilibrium because 
of continuous innovation. This can be opposed to evolutionary game theory, in which 
equilibrium is a general outcome, which is due to a complete focus on selection processes (i.e. 
an omission of regular or structural innovation). Saviotti and Mani (1995) offer a similarly 
general model based on replicator dynamics that describes the relation between variety and 
competition. They distinguish between inter- and intra-technology competition and show that 
the variety of a system can increase only if intra-technology competition is more intense than 
inter-technology competition. Moreover, new technologies can emerge only if incumbent 
technologies face weaker competition from new ones than from other incumbent ones. 
 Finally, the balance of exploration and exploitation has been approached with 
theories of evolutionary and adaptive organizations (Hannan and Freeman 1977 and 1989, 
Levinthal and March 1981, Lewin et al. 1999). The motivation for this approach is that a wide 
diversity of organizational structures can be observed in reality. This diversity applies to 
various characteristics, including form (e.g., line-staff, matrix, flat), elements (e.g., R&D, 
production, sales) and connections (e.g., formal, informal). Hannan and Freeman (1989) 
identify two types of theories of organizational change that involve adaptation. The first 
comprises selection (population adaptation) theories, which assume that diversity arises 
mainly from new organizations, as existing organizations adopt a structure early on and rarely 
change it because of rigidness. Alternatively, individual adaptation theories assume that 
individual organizations can respond and adapt to environmental changes, threats and 
opportunities. 
 
4. Optimizing diversity given recombinant innovation: a model 
An explorative model of diversity is developed here. It focuses on recombinant innovation, 
that is, innovation through combination of existing alternatives so that multiple options are 
modeled. Cumulative investment in two available options is modeled to keep the analysis 
simple. A diversity indicator is constructed with three inputs, namely variety, balance and 
disparity. The emergence or innovation of a third option is probabilistic and depends on 
diversity as measured by the diversity indicator. This type of innovation can be regarded as a 
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process of spill-over, as in the case of thin film technology being used in photovoltaic 
technology to convert solar radiation into electricity. Alternatively, innovation here can be 
considered as a modular process in the sense that the two original options come together as 
components in an emerging technology, such as batteries and personal computer technologies 
have been combined into laptops. The approach here is not only consistent with innovation of 
isolated products with a modular structure (e.g., machines, vehicles, consumer electronics, 
buildings) but also network (service) markets where modularity often takes the form of 
complementary products (e.g., hardware and software, computer and internet). Moreover, the 
relevance of the proposed approach is not limited to spillovers between technologies. Murray 
(2002) illustrates with the case of tissue engineering that important innovations in both 
technology and science can accompany spillover of knowledge in either direction. 
Direct benefits associated with the presence of each option depend on scale; in 
particular, there may be increasing or decreasing returns to scale (both on demand and supply 
sides, which are not separately described here, or remain implicit). As a result, optimal 
diversity based on maximizing total benefits can proceed by trading-off returns to scale and 
innovation benefits, both of which depend on the level of diversity. The model can be 
considered as evolutionary, in a very limited sense, as it describes a minimum population of 
two alternatives (technologies) while interaction between these can increase the number up to 
three alternatives. This is a very simple conceptualization but nevertheless a logical point of 
departure for a formal analysis of the mentioned trade-off. 
 Below we present the model equations. Note that the model is dynamic so that all 
variables have time subscripts. These are omitted to improve readability.  
Investment in two available and one hypothetical option and resulting cumulative 
investment or capital stocks are as follows: 
 
dO1/dt = I1          (1) 
dO2/dt = I2          (2) 
dO3/dt = Pe*I3           (3) 
 
with  
 
I1 = a*I           (4) 
I2 = (1-a)*I.          (5) 
 
Here Oi denotes the cumulative production of option i, which can be interpreted as an 
indicator of cumulative knowledge about the respective technology. Ii is investment in option 
i (at time t), and a is a fraction denoting investment allocation (0≤ a ≤1), the proportion of the 
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investment budget (I) in year t spent on option 1. Note that a might be variable over time (i.e. 
have a time index as well), but for the analysis hereafter we consider only constant a values 
over time. Pe is the probability of emergence of a third option, which is explained below. To 
keep the model simple, it is assumed that there is no depreciation of technological knowledge 
or capital (in the case of pure knowledge, the preferred interpretation, one might argue that 
depreciation will be rather slow or negligible). The right hand side of the third equation 
represents the expected value of benefits associated with investment in hypothetical option 3, 
based on uncertainty about the emergence of option 3. The values of I and I3 are exogenous to 
the model, as the central problem is optimal diversity of options 1 and 2, or optimal allocation 
of investment between options one and two. Initial conditions for the three cumulative 
variables are2 
 
O1(0)= 0, O2(0)= 0, O3(0)= 0.        (6) 
 
Total benefits B are the sum of benefits associated with each alternative, such as Bi for option 
i: 
 
B = B1 + B2 + B3.         (7) 
 
We are interested in the optimal (maximum) value B(T), that is, the value of B at some final 
time T (time horizon), which in the next section will be the end of the simulation period. 
Returns to scale are formalized through the following benefit functions associated with each 
option at time T: 
 
B1(T) = O1(T) s          (8) 
B2(T) = O2(T) s          (9) 
B3(T) = (O3(T)*D2)s.         (10) 
 
Here Oi(T) denotes the value of Oi at time T. Returns to scale s (s>0) in each of these 
equations reflect the presence of increasing returns on the production side (e.g., economies of 
scale, learning) as well as the demand side (familiarity, reputation). Applying s to Oi(T) 
means that the size of the option at time T, for example, the cumulative rather than static (per 
point in time) investment in an option up to time horizon T, is the basis for calculating the 
effect of increasing returns. This is done as returns to scale do not cover just static economies 
                                                          
2
 Setting initial values of the options equal to zero does not undermine the general character of the analysis, as the 
insights obtained in the next section would not alter with positive values of options one and two (reflecting their 
history before the initial time of the simulated period). Of course, option 3 cannot exist at the initial time. 
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of scale in production but also dynamic learning effects over the entire period [0,T]. Note that 
the returns to scale apply to single options (1, 2 and 3) and not to the total (sum) of the three 
options/technologies since returns to scale relate to separate market shares (demand and 
supply side) for each of these options. The inclusion of the quadratic term with disparity D in 
equation 10 reflects a nonlinear effect that disparity between options 1 and 2 has on the 
benefits associated with option 3 (once emerging). These benefits increase more than linear 
with the level of disparity as higher values of disparity are assumed to imply more radical 
innovations, which in turn are associated with relatively high benefits. 
 Innovation occurs through combination of existing alternatives or spill-over, and the 
degree of diversity is affecting this process. Following Stirling (1998), diversity ∆ is defined 
as follows: 
 
∆ = 0.5*N*L*D .         (11) 
 
Diversity has three components, as discussed in Section 2, namely the number of alternatives 
(N), balance (L), and disparity (D). Moreover, diversity is positively related to each of the 
components. The multiplicative form can be seen as consistent with the idea that different 
components of diversity can substitute for each other (in terms of the net diversity effect) but 
only up to some degree. As opposed, an additive form would assume perfect and limitless 
substitution, which seems a too extreme assumption to make. Fixed complementarity (or 
fixed proportions) as in a Leontief type of function seems also too strict. The multiplicative 
form can be seen as avoiding the extreme character of both alternative specifications. Another 
interpretation follows from the higher dimension diversity function (equation 14 in the next 
section), namely as variety weighted by a combination of balance and disparity (see Stirling 
2007, Table 2). 
Variety N can tak  two values here, namely N=1 in case of specialization, and N=2 if 
there is (some) diversity. Balance L is defined as 
 
L = Min(O1,O2)/Max(O1,O2) .        (12) 
 
This function assures that the more balance between cumulative investments in both options 
is realized, the higher diversity is. Stirling (2007) proposes an alternative specification, which 
shows the same qualitative behavior and which we will use later on as well (in equation 14). 
Disparity will in the two option case later have a default value 1 so that the value of 
diversity ∆ is then in the range 0 to 1. Note further that since the inputs Oi change over time, 
∆ is a dynamic variable as well. Finally, the resulting specification of ∆ is consistent with core 
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features (i) to (v) of a general diversity heuristic, as formulated by Stirling (2007). In 
particular, if N=1, then L=0, so that ∆=0, which is Stirling’s feature (i). 
Next, the probability of innovation or emergence of a new, third option can be made 
dependent on the diversity index: 
 
Pe = p*∆/(Dα), α≥0.         (13) 
 
More overall diversity in the system means a higher probability of recombinant innovation. 
Parameter p is exogenous and can be interpreted in several ways. A first interpretation is that 
it reflects the nature of a particular technology or type of knowledge; for example, for some 
technologies or knowledge the likelihood of successful (marketable, profitable) innovations 
due to recombination of existing technologies or knowledge is higher than for others, which 
would be reflected by a higher value of parameter p. It seems that, for instance, ICT 
technologies are characterized by relatively many opportunities for recombination with other 
ICT components as well as traditional technologies (add-on components to cars, television 
sets, hifi equipment, kitchen equipment, microelectronics), explaining the wave of ICT related 
innovations since the early 1980s. A second, additional (i.e. not competitive) interpretation is 
that parameter p can change over time, countries or again technologies due the differential 
effectiveness of human endeavors to produce innovations through recombination. This in turn 
depends on the regional-national innovation system, which covers such elements as the level 
of education, the organization of research (e.g., individualized, team work, isolated 
laboratories, dynamic networks), experience with research (a sort of R&D learning curve), 
public policy and institutions (tax and subsidy regimes, public R&D), and users (see Lundvall 
2007). A very fundamental factor here is formed by the collection of communication 
techniques and search methods employed for research. In this respect, the emergence of fast 
means of transport (car, train, plane), telegraph, phone, fax, printer, scanner, mobile phone, 
email, and the Internet (including electronic journals and sophisticated search engines like 
Google) can be seen as developments that have changed the fundamental conditions for 
communication and search of information, resulting in an increased likelihood of innovative 
combinations (i.e. a higher value of parameter p). The further integration and extension of 
multimedia and telecommunications means that this process has not yet come to an end (if it 
ever will). 
Next, parameter α in equation 13 can be seen as reflecting a ‘cognitive distance’, such 
as the distance between knowledge or experts on options 1 and 2. On first thought, one might 
think that D and α are proportional (i.e. a small (large) disparity automatically goes along 
with a small (large) cognitive distance). However, this is not necessarily the case, for 
example, as two options with large disparity may be associated with expertise that is bundled, 
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for various reasons, be it historical coincidence, multidisciplinary education, or multiproduct 
firms. In fact, many fundamental innovations in science have been realized by researchers 
who have crossed disciplinary boundaries, thus in a way lowering the value of α, resulting in 
an increase in the probability of recombinant success. In view of this, four possible 
combinations of disparity and cognitive distance need to be reckoned with, namely small or 
large D and small or large α (2x2). 
Disparity D has a double effect, indirectly (positively) through diversity, and directly 
(negatively) to reflect that it may be easier to combine things or enjoy positive spill-overs if 
the alternatives are not too far apart. Note that for α=1 the direct and indirect effects cancel 
out so that disparity will not affect the probability of emergence of a new option. Parameter 
values in the diversity and probability function are such that Pe≤1 is satisfied.3 Note that 
innovation may be of a more uncertain, even surprising nature than exemplified in equation 
13. This is not covered here, even though one may expect it to be relevant in the decision 
about optimal diversity. We will say more about this in Section 6. 
The indicator of disparity as a dimension of diversity allows us to make a distinction 
(in interpretation) between gradual and radical innovations: recombining options 1 and 2 
under low disparity would imply gradual innovation; doing the same under high disparity 
would mean radical innovation. Since disparity affects the benefits of the new option 3 
(positively) as well as the probability of its emergence (negatively), the net effect on total 
benefits depends on the specific values of the parameters involved. 
 
5. Numerical analysis 
Here we present numerical results obtained with model. The time horizon is set at 20, which 
is sufficient to identify the dynamic effects of diversity (i.e. recombinant innovation and its 
benefits). The following values or ranges for parameter values and exogenous factors are used 
(ranges in fact indicate that parameters will be subject to sensitivity analysis). The total 
investment budget in each period for options 1 and 2 is I = 100. Investment in the third 
option, which is not effective if this option does not emerge (i.e. if Pe = 0), is set at a constant 
level I3 = 50.4 For the probability scale parameter the range 0 ≤ p ≤ 0.5 is used, while the 
                                                          
3
 The model is consistent with both codified and tacit technological knowledge. In the first case, recombination 
will most likely occur through engineers that are specialised in different technologies exchanging or combining 
tacit knowledge about these. More balance will then mean more engineers in either technological area and 
therefore more opportunities to cooperate or exchange information. In the case of codified knowledge, a single 
individual will be able to combine knowledge about separate technologies. More balance may then go along with 
better accessibility and quality of codified information in either technological area, which in turn will enhance 
opportunities for successful recombination by a single researcher. Of course, codified knowledge is flexible in that 
it also allows recombinant innovation to follow the route of cooperation among individuals with different 
technological expertise. 
4
 Investment in option 3 is only effective if this option (probabilistically) emerges. The model requires a value of 
this investment, but it is not useful to make it part of the investment allocation problem between options 1 and 2, as 
this would confuse the essence of the model: namely analysis of the problem of optimal diversity between options 
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default value equals 0.1. This, together with the maximum value taken by the diversity index 
(=2) assures that the innovation probability will never exceed one. For the returns to scale the 
following range is used: 0.6 ≤ s ≤ 1.4. The level of disparity has a default value equal to 1 and 
is varied in the range [1,2]. The direct effect of disparity on the emergence probability is set at 
a fixed value α=1. 
 All subsequent results (graphs) plot relative total benefits over the entire period, that 
is, from 0 to time horizon T. Here, ‘relative’ denotes that the total benefits (B(T)) have been 
normalized using as a normalization factor the value of the total benefits when the allocation 
factor (a) is equal to 0. As a result, in all the graphs shown hereafter the curves intersect in the 
left corner point (where a=0), and in this point the value of the relative total benefits is equal 
to 1. Often, intersection of the curves in a single point can also be observed in the right 
corner, where a=1. This is due to symmetry of the problem. Only in the final results (Figure 
7) does intersection in a single point not occur for a=1 as here symmetry is purposefully 
foregone. 
Figure 1 shows the relative total benefits over the entire simulated time period for 
different investment allocations (horizontal axis) and for returns to scale varying from 0.6 to 
1.4 (different curves). The results show that in the case of decreasing and constant returns to 
scale, symmetric or balanced diversity (i.e. equal investment in the two options) is always 
optimal, while for sufficiently increasing returns to scale specialization or focusing is more 
attractive. The first two results are quite robust as illustrated by Figures 2, 3, and 5, while the 
last result is not robust (depends on specific parameter values), as shown in Figure 4 below. 
 
[Insert figure 1 around here] 
 
Figures 2 to 4 present the effect of different probability factors on relative total benefits. For 
decreasing (Figure 2) and constant (Figure 3) returns to scale, a higher probability of 
recombinant innovation just makes diversity a more evident choice from the perspective of 
optimal total benefits. The reason is that both figures 2 and 3 show that diversity benefits 
increase relative to specialization (corner solution) benefits. Symmetric diversity (equal 
investment in the two options) is optimal in both cases, which is the result of symmetry in the 
model (i.e. no difference between options 1 and 2 in terms of benefits, returns to scale effects, 
and disparity). Optimality of symmetric diversity becomes more pronounced for higher 
probability factors as the diversity benefits through recombinant innovation increase due to 
the balance component of diversity. The lowest positioned curves (p=0) in both figures show 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1 and 2 taking into account the emergence of option 3. An allocation of total investment among three options 
would only be relevant for the research question if as a result a fourth option could emerge as a combination of the 
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that without any possibility of recombinant innovation under constant returns to scale (figure 
3), there will be no difference in benefits between alternative investment allocations (so that 
one will be indifferent between these), while under decreasing returns symmetric diversity is 
hardly more attractive than nearby positions on the curve (i.e. the symmetric diversity 
optimum becomes much less pronounced). In fact, if uncertainty about the future were taken 
into account, one might result to be quite indifferent between allocations in the a-parameter 
range 0.3-0.7 because of the small differences in benefit terms. 
 
[Insert figures 2 – 3 around here] 
 
Increasing returns to scale (Figure 4) in principle favor specialization (i.e. concentration of 
investments in one alternative), but this is countered by increasing the probability factor of 
recombinant innovation, which results in an improved pay-off of diversity. In other words, 
there are two counter forces at work here, namely increasing returns to scale and the chain 
diversity-recombination-innovation. These two forces attain different balances or net effects 
in benefit terms on the range of investment allocations. As a result, a three-modal pattern 
appears in Figure 4 for higher probability factors. This figure shows that for a value of 
parameter p=0.8, symmetric diversity (a=0.5) provides the highest total benefits, that is, 
higher than in the cases of extreme specialization (investment allocation equal to 0 or 1). Note 
that the shape of the curve can be interpreted as the existence of three local optima. If these 
local optima have the same total benefit value, one will be indifferent between them. 
However, this is a very unlikely situation, since for most combinations of parameter values 
either the two specialization allocations (a=0 and a=1) will have the highest value (two global 
optima, again due to symmetry of options 1 and 2) or symmetric diversity (a=0.5) will have 
the highest total benefit (i.e. one global optimum, as in the upper curve of Figure 4). From an 
empirical perspective, the case of increasing returns to scale is least trivial and deserves 
special attention to see which counter force is dominant. Evidently, this would require 
estimation of the values of the parameters involved. 
 
[Insert figure 4 around here] 
  
In line with the interpretations of the parameter p in the previous section, we can regard the 
patterns in figures 2 to 4 as reflecting changes in p over time due to individual and 
organizational learning in the R&D process (public or private), or alternatively as a 
comparison of regions/countries (or technologies) that show different propensities of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
first three. However, the investment in this fourth option would then need to be set exogenously, which just shifts 
the problem. 
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recombinant innovation due the particular features of the regional/national innovation system 
(or the technology). For example, according to the first interpretation, a larger p might denote 
the emergence and increasing influence over time of telecommunications (phone, fax, email, 
Internet, search engines, electronic journals) on R&D activity in general, and in line with the 
second interpretation, it might reflect that R&D in some economic sectors is less sensitive to 
the influence of Internet than other sectors. The general implication is that depending on the 
returns to scale, according to the intertemporal interpretation of different values of p the role 
of diversity and the optimal level of diversity may change over time, while according to the 
inter-sectoral or inter-regional/county interpretation, diversity may matter more or less for 
some than for other sectors or countries.  
One can further identify a value of diversity associated with each of the curves in 
figures 1 to 4. This notion can be defined as the difference between total benefits at 
investment allocation = 0.5 (maximum diversity) and investment allocation = 0 or 1 (no 
diversity). In some cases (figures) this diversity value is positive while in others it is negative, 
evidently depending on whether diversity is optimal in total benefit terms or not. 
 Next we turn to disparity. Figure 5 and 6 show results for different levels of disparity 
in the range [1-2]. It is shown that under constant returns to scale, more disparity means that 
diversity pays more off (Figure 5). Under increasing returns to scale (Figure 6) this effect 
gives rise to a pattern similar to the one in Figure 4. Note that only with sufficient balance 
(investment allocation between 0.4 and 0.8) does the effect of disparity become visible. Of 
course, this depends on the value (or explored range) of disparity, and it is not clear in general 
whether this is realistic from an empirical perspective. Measurement of disparity in practice 
could resolve this but is likely to be difficult. 
 
[Insert figures 5 and 6 around here] 
 
 A final analysis offered concerns heterogeneous disparity values. For this purpose we 
need to change the set-up of the model slightly. First, we need initially (at least) three options 
and the probabilistic emergence of a fourth option, since with only two initial options one has 
only a single disparity (between options 1 and 2) and therefore no opportunity to arrange 
heterogeneity of disparity values. With three options one will have disparity values for the 
difference (or distance) between options 1 and 2, 1 and 3, and 2 and 3, three different 
disparity values. To retain the focus on diversity of two options (1 and 2), we add to these a 
third, exogenous option. The exogenous character of this additional option means that the 
allocation problem and thus the focus on diversity of options 1 and 2 does not alter. However, 
adding a third option means that the specification of the diversity function used before is 
problematic. Instead, we apply therefore a more general (but also more complicated) diversity 
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function, as proposed by Stirling (2007): ΣiΣj≠i dijfifj . Here dij is disparity between option i and 
j, and fi is frequency or share of option i. In the present case fi = Oi/(O1+O2+Ox) so that the 
diversity function takes the following form: 
 
∆ = d12*O1*O2/(O1+O2+Ox)2 + d13*O1*Ox/(O1+O2+Ox)2 + d23*O2*Ox/(O1+O2+Ox)2. (14) 
 
Note that option 3 is denoted by a subindex x to reflect the exogenous nature of this option. 
We set the extra exogenous option Ox = 1000 (i.e., this option is constant over the entire 
simulation period) to realize a magnitude that is conform average investment in options 1 and 
2 over 20 time periods being equal to 1000 (i.e. 20*100/2). To control model complexity, the 
direct effect of disparity on the innovation probability is omitted (i.e. we set parameter α=0).5  
Results for heterogeneous disparity values are shown in Figure 7 for constant returns 
to scale. A few remarks are in order. A methodological one is that the curves are 
differentiable as opposed to the ones in the previous graphs. This is due to the new diversity 
function. Indeed, the specification of the balance function in equation 12 caused non-
differentiability in a=0.5, as can be seen in figures 1 to 6. The symmetry in the bottom two 
curves results from equal disparities d13 and d23, while the higher of these curves is explained 
by the higher value of d12, which increases the overall diversity value and as a result the 
innovation probability and derived expected benefits, except where there is no diversity 
(therefore the curves intersect in the corner points). More interesting are the asymmetric 
optima in the two top curves. These are due to the asymmetric distance of options 1 and 2 to 
option x. The lowest of these curves is monotonically increasing, meaning that pure 
specialization in option 1 is optimal (no diversity). Note that this is under constant returns to 
scale and entirely due to d13 being larger than the other disparity parameters. Thus, with 
constant returns to scale heterogeneity of diversity can lead to specialization being optimal. If, 
however, the value of disparity d12 is subsequently increased (from 1 to 2), the upmost 
positioned curve is obtained. This curve has 0.7 as an optimum value, which means 
(asymmetric) diversity with a bias towards option 1. This result can be seen as a balance 
between opposing forces exerted by disparity d12 and disparity d13.  
Thus, in addition to the specialization (regardless in which option) and symmetric 
diversity (perfect balance) as optimal solutions identified in the previous analyses (figures 1-
6), with heterogeneous disparity two other type of solutions arises, namely pure specialization 
in one specific option and asymmetric diversity (imbalance). One can understand the 
difference between these latter two results, associated with the two highest curves in figure 7, 
as follows. If d12 has a low value (1) then options one and two are very near to each other so 
                                                          
5
 For three instead of two options a different, more general specification of this effect would be needed. 
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that the difference in distances between options 1 and 2 to option x matters much for 
recombinant innovation; that is, such innovation will be most likely or effective if 1 and x are 
combined since d13 > d23 (2>1). In other words, specialization in option 1 is optimal. If then 
d12 attains a higher value (2), recombination of options 1 and 2 becomes a more likely 
outcome as well so that the value of investing not only in option 1 but also a bit in option 2 
(asymmetric diversity) is optimal. Here, one in fact benefits from the availability of multiple 
viable recombinations (1+2, 1+3, and 2+3), together making the likelihood of any 
recombinant innovation higher. 
 
[Insert Figure 7 around here] 
 
 Finally, since we perform a dynamic analysis, a word on discounting is in order. 
Discounting implies that the future is perceived as less important by the decision-maker than 
the present. This holds for investments in both a single option and diversity of investments. 
Discounting was found not to affect the pattern of relative total benefits much. A possible 
explanation is that an expected value approach is used here to calculate the effect of 
probabilistic innovation on benefits, which results in a uniform distribution of impacts of 
diversity over time. One would expect that if diversity pays off only or especially in the very 
long run, then the more one discounts the future the less diversity would pay-off (in relative 
terms). Either a stochastic approach or one that includes the effect of size of investments on 
the innovation probability could realize such an influence of time horizon and discounting. 
Note, finally, that whereas the model excludes depreciation of invested capital in each option, 
inclusion of discounting might be interpreted as such. Of course, depreciation might be very 
slow if cumulative investment in an option is interpreted as a stock of knowledge rather than 
physical capital. 
 
6. Policy implications 
What are the policy implications of the findings of the previous analysis? For this purpose we 
have to examine the conditions under which each of the four solutions is optimal: pure 
specialization (no diversity) regardless in which option, pure specialization in one specific 
option, symmetric diversity (perfect balance), and asymmetric diversity (imbalance). The 
model parameter conditions associated with each type of optimal diversity may provide clues 
for policy and management. The immediate role of the government is to stimulate that at the 
societal level, at each point in time, diversity is such that an optimal trade-off between scale 
and innovation benefits results. A more fundamental role of the government is to manipulate 
the innovation parameters through adequate policies. The two core parameters are the 
probability factor, which co-determines the probability of successful recombination of 
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existing technologies, and disparity, which reflects the difference between combined 
technologies. 
In particular, a government could increase the probability factor by stimulating 
technologies that can be easily combined into a new technology, notably by striving for 
modular technologies since this allows the easy substitution or exchange of modules, resulting 
in an increase in the number of potential innovative combinations. Moreover, as illustrated by 
Watson  using evolutionary computation, modules can be seen to represent preadapted (or 
preselected) units that allow faster and more likely evolutionary progress as well as a greater 
degree of complexity than is possible with gradual, non-modular evolution (see also 
Birchenhall 1995). Thus, modularization can increase the benefits of variety through realizing 
higher recombination probabilities and more radical innovations. 
The notion of modularization opens up the debate on the setting and appropriability 
of standards (David and Greenstein 1990, Besen and Farrell 1994). Indeed, standards at the 
product, technology or component (module) level become less desirable when they go at the 
cost of opportunities for recombinant innovation. Governments might require fewer standards 
or implement policy to avoid the spontaneous or early emergence of certain standards (i.e. 
competition between standards according to Besen and Farrell) unless standards are such that 
they do not hamper or even facilitate recombinant innovation (i.e. competition within a 
standard according to Besen and Farrell). Similar policy considerations are at stake when 
addressing the risk of inefficient lock-in, so now there is one more reason to worry about 
standards.  
Policy may try to raise the value of disparity between technological options to 
increase innovation benefits, notably through radical innovations. For this purpose, 
governments could use their tool of public investment in R&D and assure that niches with 
‘deviant’ technologies emerge or survive. In particular, governments might promote disparity 
by funding risky R&D and by facilitating the creation of technological niches (Schot and 
Geels, 2007). 
 A general policy advice emanating from this study is that one should cherish ones 
failures and innovative wastage. Striving for specialization, focus and false certainty about 
efficiency (i.e. short term cost-effectiveness) hampers evolutionary progress. This implies that 
decisions informed by short-term cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis excluding 
recombinant innovation may be detrimental to the system in the long run. A balance between 
short term efficiency and diversity needs to be arrived at. The precise balance is likely to 
depend not only on the factors discussed and modeled here, but also on the degree of 
uncertainty about innovations: the larger the uncertainty, the more diversity may be needed. 
This follows directly from adding the insurance to the recombinant perspective on diversity.  
Notice further that diversity choices might take the scale and extent of a system into 
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account. The reason is that maintaining a specific level of diversity may be costlier the 
smaller is the scale (e.g., a city or region). With a very large system scale (e.g., a country, 
continent or the world) there possibly is more room for simultaneously enjoying scale 
advantages and diversity benefits so that the conflict between scale and diversity becomes less 
pronounced. The latter partly depends on whether or not scale advantages and diversity 
benefits are subject to diminishing returns. 
 The foregoing policy insights should be judged in a broader context innovation and 
investment policy analysis. A fairly large literature offers a variety of considerations, based 
on evolutionary economics, notably neo-Schumpeterian innovation theories and a number of 
other approaches (e.g., Nelson and Winter 1982, David 1986 and 1987, Freeman 1987, Dosi 
et al. 1988, Nelson 1993, Metcalfe 1995, Cantner and Pyka 2001, Pelikan and Wegner 2003, 
Witt 2003, Dopfer 2005, Sartorius and Zundel 2005). A shortcoming of many of these policy 
discussions is that, whereas the positive side of the analysis is clear (e.g., grounded in 
evolutionary or neoclassical economics), the normative side is implicit or even absent. As a 
result, policy suggestions are not always well founded. Sometimes it seems just to be assumed 
that more innovation and diversity are automatically good for society, as if they have no costs, 
while in other cases the benefits of diversity are completely overlooked (as discussed in 
Section 1). Either approach represents an extreme viewpoint that is hard to defend as a 
general model. The conceptual model proposed in the current paper was precisely aimed to 
fill this gap. Even though it may not be complete in its description of reality, it nevertheless 
provides a concrete starting point for theorizing about, and empirical analysis of, innovation 
policy from the angle of diversity.  
 
7. Conclusions 
A technological path that contains just a few very efficient  (i.e. low cost or quick payback)  
options may seem very attractive in the short run, but ultimately, in the long run, it provides a 
narrow basis for selection to act upon. It can moreover slow down innovations as few 
innovative combinations and spill-overs will occur. Both negative impacts of limiting 
diversity  (on selection and innovation)  will restrict potential progress of a system in the long 
run. 
 The central message of this paper is threefold. First, diversity,  irrespective of 
whether relating to technologies, behaviors, organizations or institutions,  needs to be 
addressed as changing and endogenous. Second, diversity allows for recombinant and even 
modular innovation, which possibly represents its most important benefit. This role of 
diversity is different from the more traditional perspective on diversity as an insurance against 
unforeseen events or changes in the external environment. Third, diversity is to be seen as an 
investment rather than a cost (i.e. associated with not only costs but also benefits). From an 
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evolutionary-economic perspective, evolutionary progress due to diversity can be translated 
into economic benefit terms. The essential trade-off that appears then is between the benefits 
and costs of diversity, or between evolutionary progress benefits (much diversity and thus 
recombinant innovation) and increasing returns to scale (specialization, i.e. little or no 
diversity). Optimizing this trade-off gives an optimal level of diversity. 
 The literature that links diversity to investment choice, irreversibility and uncertainty 
was reviewed, where it was noted that many and very different approaches exist. None of 
these, however, combines a treatment of diversity as endogenous and dynamic with the 
mentioned cost-benefit trade-off to determine optimal diversity. Nevertheless, various 
interesting suggestions emerge from this literature. 
 An own model of optimal diversity was then proposed. It takes as a starting point the 
problem of allocation of an investment budget between two alternative options. Based on this, 
a diversity indicator was constructed involving three dimensions, namely variety, balance and 
disparity. The level of diversity probabilistically determines recombinant innovation or 
emergence of a third option. Next, total benefits over time for the three options are influenced 
by returns to scale (increasing, constant or decreasing). The resulting model can be regarded 
as representing a first effort to capture optimal diversity as the trade-off between increasing 
returns to scale associated with each option and the benefits of recombinant innovation 
resulting from diversity.  
It is found that with decreasing or constant returns to scale, maximum diversity (equal 
investment in both options) is optimal. However, possibly reality is generally better 
characterized by increasing returns to scale. The model shows that in this case diversity 
becomes attractive only if the (emergence) probability factor of recombinant innovation is 
sufficiently large. Diversity then pays off if it is sufficiently high, as a higher diversity implies 
a higher emergence probability. In addition, more disparity increases the value of diversity 
and can make diversity attractive in the case of increasing returns. The results indicate four 
types of optimal diversity under various conditions: complete specialization (no diversity) 
regardless of which option, complete specialization in one specific option, symmetric 
diversity (perfect balance), and asymmetric diversity (imbalance). The second and fourth 
solutions require heterogeneous disparity. The parameter conditions under which each type of 
optimal diversity arises may provide clues for empirical testing and application to policy of 
the results. From an empirical perspective, the case of increasing returns to scale is perhaps 
most interesting as two counter forces are at work and one would like to know which 
ultimately dominates. 
A number of general policy lessons were derived from the analysis. An immediate 
role of the government is to stimulate public investments, at the societal level, where diversity 
is always in line with an optimal trade-off between scale and innovation benefits for society 
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as a whole. A more fundamental role of the government is to manipulate the innovation 
parameters through adequate policies. In particular, it could stimulate the development of 
modular technologies that allow many innovative combinations. Setting or spontaneous 
emergence of standards is not only relevant from the perspective of the risk of lock-in, but 
also will need to take consequences for recombinant innovation into account. The latter is 
likely to depend on the particular technology at stake. Policy might further stimulate radical 
innovations by raising the disparity between technological options, notably by directing 
public R&D at ‘deviant’ technologies and by funding risky R&D. Next, the larger is the 
uncertainty about a recombinant innovation, the more diversity may be required along an 
optimal path. Finally, coordination of strategic technology policy between different countries 
might reduce the conflict between scale and diversity since in effect the total volume of all 
innovation and investment activity is then enlarged. 
It is worth noting that the results obtained here do not seem to require that 
recombination is the only mechanism of innovation. The fact that there is non-recombinant 
innovation as well does not deny the benefits of recombinant innovation and therefore of 
diversity. This, however, leads to an interesting side question, namely whether all innovation 
is of a recombinant nature. As already argued by various earlier writers (e.g., Schumpeter 
1934, Weitzman 1998b), it is difficult to imagine an innovation that cannot be cast in terms of 
combining things, regardless of whether it is a new idea, a new product, a new music style 
(Geels 2007), a new technology, or a new organization. In a modern economic context this is 
certainly true as innovations are the outcome of cooperation or at least interaction between 
many researchers, both in private companies and universities, and cooperation implies 
recombination (which is not the same as to say that recombination requires cooperation; 
probably as much it needs isolation and competition). Even a so-called ‘spontaneous 
mutation’ in a gene or technology is just an easy label for a black box that once opened may 
appear to be a combination of factors. 
 Evidently, the model presented here offers no more than a starting point for 
examining optimal diversity. It is easy to identify directions for further research. Instead of an 
expected value approach one might model innovation as a stochastic process (e.g., as the 
emergence of a viable recombination with a dichotomous probability 0/1). Monte Carlo 
experiments can then be used to provide average outcomes for the model system. Another 
extension would be to let the emergence probability depend also on the size of cumulative 
investments in the various options, next to balance and disparity. In addition, the emergence 
of option three is now modeled as an instantaneous event. However, in many cases 
innovations keep being modified and improved once they have emerged (witness the notions 
of product and industry life cycle). This might be incorporated by using a sequence of altering 
values of option three. Next, one could investigate the nature of the marginal benefits to 
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diversity. The presence of a greater number of options may give rise to more spillovers, and 
their number would at first seem to be proportional to the number of combinations among 
options possible. However, one cannot exclude decreasing returns to the number of options. 
This problem becomes more complex if modular innovation can involve more than two 
components (i.e. recombination with three or more inputs). Analysis of recombinant 
innovation as here also offers an easy connection with the notion of coevolution  (of different 
technologies or even of technology and science). An entirely different type of extension is to 
add selection, for example with replicator dynamics. This could focus on competing instead 
of complementary techniques. Finally, a number of empirical issues are relevant as well. 
Perhaps the crucial question is how a system of options can be demarcated to capture the 
relevant spillover or recombination opportunities. Demarcation is difficult if one believes that 
in principle not any combination in the economy can be excluded, which would ultimately 
suggest a global perspective. Historical case studies of clear recombinant innovations, 
including interviews with core players about the ‘search space’, might shed some light on this 
issue. 
 
References 
Andersen, E.S., 1994. Evolutionary Economics: Post-Schumpeterian Contributions. 
London: Pinter. 
Arrow, K.J., Fisher, A.C., 1974. Environmental preservation, uncertainty, and irreversibility. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 88, 312–319.  
Arthur, W.B., 1989. Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical 
events. Economic Journal 99, 116-131. 
Aslaksen, I., Synnestvedt, T., 2004. Are the Dixit-Pindyck and the Arrow-Fisher-Henry-
Hanemann option values equivalent? Discussion Papers No. 390, Statistics Norway, 
Oslo. 
Baumgärtner, S., 2004. Optimal investment in multi-species protection: Interacting species 
and ecosystem health. EcoHealth 1, 101-110. 
Besen, S.M., Farrell, J. 1994. Choosing how to compete: Strategies and tactics in 
standardization. Journal of Economic Perspectives 8(2), 117-131. 
Birchenhall, C., 1995. Modular technical change and genetic algorithms. Computational 
Economics 8, 233-253. 
Birge, J.R., Rosa, C.H., 1996. Incorporating investment uncertainty into greenhouse policy 
models. The Energy Journal 17, 79-90. 
Black, F., Scholes, M., 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Journal of 
Political Economy 81, 637-654. 
Cantner, U., Pyka, A., 2001. Classifying technology policy from an evolutionary perspective. 
Research Policy 30, 759-775. 
Carroll, G.R., Hannan, M.T., 2000. The Demography of Corporations and Industries. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,. 
Common, M., Perrings, C., 1992. Towards an ecological economics of sustainability. 
Ecological Economics 6, 7-34. 
David, P.A., 1986. Narrow windows, blind giants and angry orphans: the dynamics of 
systems rivalries and dilemmas of technology policy. CEPR Paper 10, Stanford 
Institute for Economic Policy Research, Stanford University, March 1986. 
Page 28 of 35
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 26 
David, P.A.,, 1987. Some new standards for the economics of standardization in the 
information age. In: Dasgupta, P., Stoneman. P. (Eds.). Economic Policy and 
Technological Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 206-239. 
David, P.A., Greenstein, S., 1990. The economics of compatibility standards: An introduction 
to recent research. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 1, 3-41. 
Dixit, A.K., Pindyck, R.S., 1994. Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press.  
Dopfer, K. (Ed.), 2005. Economics, Evolution and the State: Governance of Complexity. 
Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.  
Dosi, G., Freeman, C., Nelson, R., Silverberg, G., Soete. L. (Eds.), 1988. Technical Change 
and Economic Theory. London: Pinter Publishers. 
Eiben, A.E., Smith, J.E., 2003. Introduction to Evolutionary Computing. Berlin: Springer. 
Epstein, L.G., 1980. Decision making and the temporal resolution of uncertainty. 
International Economic Review 21, 269–283. 
Esteban, J.M., Ray, D., 1994. On the measurement of polarization. Econometrica. 62, 819-
851. 
Fisher, A.C., 2000. Investment under uncertainty and option value in environmental 
economics. Resource and Energy Economics 22, 197-204. 
Fisher, AC, Krutilla, J.V., Cicchetti, C.J., 1972. The economics of environmental 
preservation. American Economic Review 62, 605-619. 
Fisher, R.A., 1930. The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Foray D., 1997. The dynamic implications of increasing returns: Technological change and 
path dependent inefficiency. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15, 733-
752. 
Freeman, C., 1987. Technology Policy and Economic Performance. London: Pinter. 
Frenken, K., 2000. A complexity approach to innovation networks. Research Policy 29, 257-
272. 
Frenken, K., 2007. A complex systems methodology to transition management. Lecture at 
Workshop on “Computational and Mathematical Approaches to Societal Transitions”. 
26 Februari - 2 March 2007, Lorentz Center, Leiden University. 
Frenken, K., Nuvolari, A., 2004. The early development of the steam engine: An evolutionary 
interpretation using complexity theory. Industrial and Corporate Change 13, 419-450. 
Frenken, K., Saviotti, P.P., Trommetter, M., 1999. Variety and niche creation in aircraft, 
helicopters, motorcycles and microcomputers. Research Policy 28, 469-488. 
Garcia, R., Calantone, R., Levine, R., 2003. The role of knowledge in resource allocation to 
exploration versus exploitation in technologically oriented organizations. Decision 
Sciences 24, 323-349. 
Geels, F.W., 2002. Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: A 
multi-level perspective and a case-study. Research Policy 31, 1257-1274. 
Geels, F.W., 2007. Analysing the breakthrough of rock ‘n’ roll (1930-1970): Multi-regime 
interaction and reconfiguration in the multi-level perspective. Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change 74, 1411-1431. 
Gollier, C., Jullien, B., Treich, N., 2000. Scientific progress and irreversibility: An economic 
interpretation of the precautionary principle. Journal of Public Economics 75, 229–253.  
Gunderson, L.H., Holling, C.S. (Eds.), 2002. Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in 
Human and Natural Systems. Washington D.C.: Island Press.  
Hannan, M.T., Freeman, J., 1977. The population ecology of organizations. American Journal 
of Sociology 83, 929-84. 
Hannan, M.T., Freeman, J., 1989. Organizational Ecology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Henderson, R., Clark, K., 1990. Architectural innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly 
35, 9-30. 
Henry, C., 1974. Investment decisions under uncertainty: The irreversibility effect. American 
Economic Review 64, 1006–12. 
Page 29 of 35
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 27 
Holling, C.S., 1973. Resilience and stability of ecological systems. Annual Review of 
Ecological Systems 4, 1-24. 
Holling, C.S., 1986. The resilience of terrestrial ecosystems: Local surprise and global 
change. In: Clark, W.C., Munn, R.E.  (Eds.). Sustainable Development of the 
Biosphere. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hong, L., Page, S.E., 2004. Groups of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of 
high-ability problem solvers. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
USA 101, 16385-89. 
Iwai, K., 1984. Schumpeterian dynamics, part I: An evolutionary model of innovation and 
imitation. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 5, 159-190. 
Kauffman, S.A., 1993. The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kolstad, C.D., 1994. The timing of CO2 control in the face of uncertainty and learning. In: 
van Ierland, E.C. (Ed.). International Environmental Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier 
Science Publishers, 75-96. 
Krutilla, J.V., 1967. Conservation reconsidered. American Economic Review 57, 777-784. 
Krysiak, F., Krysiak, D., 2006. Sustainability with uncertain future preferences. 
Environmental and Resource Economics 33, 511-531. 
Levin, S., Barrett, S. Aniyar, S., Baumol, W., Bliss, C., Bolin, B., Dasgupta, P., Ehrlich, P.,  
Folke, C., Gren, I., Holling, C.S., Jansson, A., Jansson, B.-O., Mäler, K.-G., Martin, D., 
Perrings C., Sheshinski, E., 1998. Resilience in natural and socioeconomic systems. 
Environment and Development Economics 3, 222-235. 
Levinthal, D., March, J.G., 1981. A model of adaptive organizational search. Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organization 2, 307-333. 
Lewin, A.,Y., Long, C.P., Carrol, T.N., 1999. The coevolution of new organizational forms. 
Organization Science 10, 535-551. 
Luehrman, T., 1998. Strategy as a portfolio of real options. Harvard Business Review 76, 89-
99. 
Lundvall, B.-Å., 2007. National innovation systems: from List to Freeman. In: Hanusch, H., 
Pyka, A. (Eds.). Elgar Companion to Neo-Schumpeterian Economics. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 872-881. 
Maignan, C., Ottaviano, G., Pineli, D., Rullani, F., 2003. Bio-ecological diversity vs. socio-
economic diversity: A comparison of existing measures. FEEM Working Paper no. 
13.2003. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano. 
March, J.G., 1991. Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization 
Science 2, 71–87. 
Markowitz, H.M., 1952. Portfolio selection. Journal of Finance 7, 77-91. 
Maynard Smith, J., Szathmáry, E., 1995. The Major Transitions in Evolution. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Metcalfe, J.S., 1994. Competition, Fisher's principle and increasing returns to selection. 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics 4, 327-346. 
Metcalfe, J.S., 1995. The economic foundations of technology policies: Equilibrium and 
evolutionary perspectives. In: Stoneman, P. (Ed.). Handbook of the Economics of 
Innovation and Technological Change. Oxford: Blackwell, 409-511. 
Metcalfe, J.S., 1998. Evolutionary Economics and Creative Destruction. London: Routledge. 
Mokyr, J., 1990. The Lever of the Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Munro, A., 1997. Economics and biological evolution. Environmental and Resource 
Economics 9, 429-449. 
Murray, F., 2002. Innovation as co-evolution of scientific and technological networks: 
Exploring tissue engineering. Research Policy 31, 1389-1403. 
Nelson, R., 1993. National Innovation Systems. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Nelson, R., Winter, S., 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Page 30 of 35
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 28 
Olson, O., Frey, B.S., 2002. Entrepreneurship as recombinant growth. Small Business 
Economics 19, 69-80. 
Pelikan, P., Wegner, G. (Eds.), (2003). The Evolutionary Analysis of Economic Policy. 
Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.  
Pimm, S.L., 1984. The complexity and stability of ecosystems. Nature 307, 321-326. 
Pindyck, R.S, 1991. Irreversibility, uncertainty, and investment. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 29(3), 1110-48, 
Pindyck, R.S., 2000. Irreversibilities and the timing of environmental policy. Resource and 
Energy Economics 22, 233-259. 
Porter R., 1982. The new approach to wilderness preservation through benefit-cost analysis. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 9, 59-80. 
Potts, J., 2000. The New Evolutionary Microeconomics: Complexity, Competence, and 
Adaptive Behavior. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar. 
Rammel, C., van den Bergh, J.C.J.M., 2003. Evolutionary policies for sustainable 
development: Adaptive flexibility and risk minimising. Ecological Economics 47, 121-
133. 
Sartorius, C., Zundel, S. (Eds.), 2005. Time Strategies, Innovation and Environmental Policy. 
Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.  
Saviotti, P.P., Mani, G.S., 1995. Competition, variety and technological evolution: A 
replicator dynamics model. Journal of EvoIutionary Economics 5, 369-392. 
Schlosser, G., Wagner, G.P., 2004. Modularity in Development and Evolution. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Schot, J., Geels, F.W., 2007. Niches in evolutionary theories of technical change: A critical 
survey of the literature. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 17, 605-622. 
Schumpeter, J.A., 1934. The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press,. 
Shackle, G.L.S., 1949. Expectation in Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,. 
Sharpe, W.F., 1964. Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under conditions of 
risk. Journal of Finance 19, 425-442.  
Smith, V.K., Krutilla, J.V., 1979. Endangered species, irreversibilities, and uncertainty: A 
comment. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 61, 371-75. 
Stirling, A., 1998. On the economics and analysis of diversity. SPRU Working Paper Number 
28, University of Sussex. 
Stirling, A., 2004. Diverse designs: Fostering technological diversity in innovation for 
sustainability. Science and Technology Policy Research (SPRU), University of Sussex, 
Brighton. 
Stirling, A., 2007. A general framework for analysing diversity in science, technology and 
society. Journal of the Royal Society Interface 4, 707-719. 
Swanson, T.M., 1994. The economics of extinction revisited and revised: A generalised 
framework for the analysis of the problems of endangered species and biodiversity 
losses. Oxford Economic Papers 46(Supplement), 800-821. 
Tisdell, C., Seidl, I., 2004. Niches and economic competition: Implications for economic 
efficiency, growth and diversity. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 15, 119 – 
135. 
Tsur, Y., Zemel, A., 2006. Endogenous recombinant growth. Discussion Paper No. 2.06. The 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Management. The Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem. 
Ulph, A., Ulph, D., 1997. Global warming, irreversibility and learning. Economic Journal 
107, 636-650. 
van den Bergh, J.C.J.M., 2007. Evolutionary thinking in environmental economics. Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics 17, 521-549. 
van den Bergh, J.C.J.M., Faber, A., Idenburg, A.M., Oosterhuis, F.H., 2006. Survival of the 
greenest: Evolutionary economics and policies for energy innovation. Environmental 
Sciences 3, 57-71. 
van der Heide, C.M., van den Bergh, J.C.J.M., van Ierland, E.C., 2005. Extending Weitzman's 
Page 31 of 35
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 29 
economic ranking of biodiversity protection: combining ecological and genetic 
considerations. Ecological Economics 55, 218-223. 
Walters, C., 1986. Adaptive Management of Renewable Resources. New York: MacMillan. 
Watson, R.A., 2006. Compositional Evolution: The Impact of Sex, Symbiosis, and 
Modularity on the Gradualist Framework of Evolution. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Weisbrod, B.A., 1964. Collective consumption services of individual consumption goods. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 78, 471-477. 
Weitzman, M.L., 1992. On diversity. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 363-405. 
Weitzman, M.L., 1998a. The Noah’s ark problem. Econometrica 66, 1279-1298. 
Weitzman, M.L., 1998b. Recombinant growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 331-360. 
Witt, U., 2003. Economic policy making in evolutionary perspective. Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics 13, 77 - 94. 
Woodward, R.T., Bishop, R.C., 2000. Efficiency, sustainability and global warming. 
Ecological Economics 14, 101-111. 
Young, R.A., 2001. Uncertainty and the Environment: Implications for Decision Making and 
Environmental Policy. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar. 
 
Page 32 of 35
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Figures (#=7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0,75
0,95
1,15
1,35
1,55
1,75
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Investment allocation
R
el
at
iv
e 
to
ta
l b
en
ef
its
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
Figure 1. Relative total benefits of diversity in investment allocation for different returns to scale 
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Figure 2. Relative total benefits of diversity in investment allocation for different probability 
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